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ACCOUNTING FIRM OR GUARANTOR? THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
ANSWER TO RULE 10b-5'S SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN
ACCOUNTANT LIABILITY CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
While accounting firms are supposed to act as the watchdogs of the
marketplace, ensuring confidence in and lending stability to the compa-
nies that drive our economy, the reality is much less awe-inspiring.I In the
past year, Arthur Andersen ("Andersen"), the previously well-regarded ac-
counting firm, has gone down in infamy.2 Together with many other well-
publicized debacles by accounting industry giants, the industry has be-
come the securities fraud scapegoat, whether deserving or not.
3
Nevertheless, well before Andersen became infamous for paper shred-
ding, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") instituted the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 19344 ("Exchange Act") to protect investors from
the fraudulent practices that have become all too prevalent in today's se-
curities markets. 5 Section 10(b) 6 of the Exchange Act combined with SEC
1. See generallyJulie Faussie, Note, Limiting Liability in Public Accounting Suits: A
Desperate Appealfrom a Beleaguered Profession, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1041 (1994) (discuss-
ing economic and commercial realities that limit accountants); see also Bily v. Ar-
thur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992) ("An auditor is a watchdog, not a
bloodhound.").
2. See generally In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp.
2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (discussing Andersen).
3. See Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lauyer: A Primer on Legal and
Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. LAw. 143, 175 n.139 (2002) ("The blizzard of accounting and
related scandals following Enron and Andersen suggests the breadth of the prob-
lem: Adelphia, CMS Energy, Dynergy, Merrill Lynch, Tyco, WorldCom, Xerox.").
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1997).
5. See S. REP. No. 792, at 1-5 (1934) (noting that 1934 Act was intended to
protect investors against manipulation of stock prices by, in part, imposing regular
reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities
exchanges).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (addressing manipulative and deceptive prac-
tices). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sales of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
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Rule 10b-57 are the prime weapons against securities fraud.8 One of the
five basic elements required to state a valid cause of action under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is scienter.9 Over twenty-five years ago, the Supreme
Court defined scienter in the securities fraud context as "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."10
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit un-
dertook the issue of scienter in In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Securities Liti-
gation."1 There, the shareholders of Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. ("Ikon")
brought a class action suit against Ikon's auditor, Ernst & Young LLP
("Ernst"), claiming a Section 10(b) violation. 12 Ernst defended on the
ground that it lacked scienter, one of the elements of a Section 10(b)
violation, and because this element was missing, it could not be liable.13
In addressing the issue of Ernst's scienter, the court established a "de-
manding threshold," holding that to find Section 10(b) liability for fraud
"the mere second-guessing of calculations will not suffice."1 4 Instead, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the accountant's judgment was so egre-
gious that "a reasonable accountant reviewing the facts and figures should
7. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999) (serving as general anti-fraud provision in
federal security laws). Casting the law in similar terms as Section 10(b), SEC Rule
l0b-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
8. See Scott J. Davis, Liability Under Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIEs LAw 723, 729 (2000) (ex-
plaining Rule lOb-5's role in 1934 Act).
9. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999) (setting forth statute provisions); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1994) (setting forth statute provisions).
10. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that scien-
ter is essential element of any private claim under Rule 10b-5); see also Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (holding that scienter is required element of any
SEC action under Rule lOb-5).
11. 277 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 2002).
12. See id. at 662 (setting forth facts of case). For a further discussion of /kon's
facts and procedural history, see infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
13. See id. (noting that Ernst filed motion for summary judgment); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (stating that court is
required to deny motion for summary judgment if there is material issue of fact
with respect to any element in plaintiffs cause of action).
14. Ikon, 277 F.3d at 673 (discussing scienter requirements). For a further




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 5 [2003], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss5/3
have concluded . . .[the company's] financial statements were misstated
and that as a result the public was likely to be misled."1 5
In the wake of the Andersen/Enron debacle, the Third Circuit's an-
nouncement of this standard does not indicate that the court is tightening
the reigns on accounting firms, but rather, albeit justifiably, the court is
relieving accountants from a market-perceived expectation of infallibil-
ity. 16 The Third Circuit recognizes that accountants only attest to the reli-
ability of a company's financial statements; they provide no guarantees.
17
Because flawlessness is not expected, accountants must act intentionally
before the Third Circuit deems them to have acted with scienter.18 Conse-
quently, the Rkon court's application of this standard reveals that potential
plaintiffs may have to carry a difficult burden in order to prove an ac-
counting firm's scienter in the absence of the proverbial smoking gun. 19
This Casebrief reviews the Third Circuit's interpretation and applica-
tion of Section 10(b)'s scienter requirement, while also looking at the Ikon
holding's overall effect on the treatment of accounting firms in security
fraud suits. First, Part II provides a general examination of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5's scienter requirement. 20 Part III analyzes the Third Cir-
cuit's approach to scienter, tracing the evolution of the scienter standard
within this circuit.2 ' Finally, Part IV discusses the broader implications of
the scienterjurisprudence, namely, the effect of scienter on the Third Cir-
cuit's overall treatment of accounting firms' liability.22 This final section
will also provide advice to practitioners who may encounter a scienter
issue.23
15. Ikon, 277 F.3d at 673 (stating that because plaintiffs did not satisfy this
demanding standard, there is no triable issue with respect to scienter and, thus,
summary judgment in favor of Ernst & Young was granted).
16. See id. (noting that audits do not guarantee correct statements).
17. See id. (noting that professional audits only account for error).
18. See id. (discussing scienter requirements for accountants); see also In re
Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 680, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that
accounting is more like art than science, court states that "[t]he fact that a future
prediction turns out to be wrong does not mean it was fraudulent").
19. See Ikon, 277 F.3d at 673 (noting that conduct must have been "sufficiently
egregious").
20. For a further discussion of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5's scienter re-
quirement, see infra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of scienter in
cases prior to Ikon, see infra notes 70-103 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the broader implications of the Third Circuit's
scienter jurisprudence, see infra notes 151-74 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of advice to practitioners facing scienter issues,
see infra notes 151-74 and accompanying text.
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II. SECTION 10(b) AND THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT
A. General Background of Section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5
Passed in the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash, the Exchange
Act aimed to increase investor confidence in the public securities market
by regulating the investments being offered and traded to prevent manip-
ulation of stock prices. 24 Section 10(b) is the primary anti-fraud provision
of the Exchange Act.25 As a companion rule to Section 10(b), the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it illegal to defraud or deceive by
any means or method in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity.26 Rule 10b-5 does not expressly grant private parties the right to
bring an action. 27 Beginning in 1946, however, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized an implied right
of action under the Rule in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.28 The Supreme
Court has since put to rest any lingering questions regarding the legiti-
macy of private causes of action and their existence for violations of Rule
10b-5 is now well established. 29
The federal courts are in general agreement regarding the basic ele-
ments required to state a valid cause of action under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 0 A plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made a mis-
24. See S. REP. No. 792, at 1-5 (1934) (noting that 1934 Act also imposed regu-
lar reporting requirements on companies whose stock is traded on national securi-
ties exchanges).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994) (making deceptive conduct unlawful).
26. See David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under
Rule lOb-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reforn Act of 1995, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1781, 1784 (2000) (describing history of Rule 10b-5); see also Angelastro v.
Prudential-Backe Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that "in
connection with" requirement of Section 10(b) actions requires causal connection
between claimed fraud and purchase or sale of security).
27. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999) (stating specific behavior is "unlawful");
see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (reiterating that by
its terms, Section 10(b) does not create express civil remedy for its violation and
that neither Congress nor SEC suggested in adoption of Rule lOb-5 that private
cause of action for violations existed).
28. 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (noting that plaintiffs sued defen-
dant claiming that fraudulent misrepresentations and conspiracy caused plaintiffs
to sell their stock to defendants for less than stock's true value).
29. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S 6, 10
(1971) (stating that plaintiff-investor was harmed financially because of defen-
dant's fraud in sale of securities and thus plaintiff entitled to civil remedy pursuant
to Section 10(b)); see also, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 730 (1975) (supporting claim of private cause of action).
30. See, e.g., GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 212 (3d Cir.
2001) (stating that proof of these elements for securities fraud is "well settled");
Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing plain-
tiff's burden of proof in Rule lob-5 claim); Shushany v. Allwaste, Inc., 92 F.2d 517,
520-21 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting five elements of securities fraud claim).
1332 [Vol. 48: p. 1329
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statement or an omission of a material fact,-"' (2) with scienter,3 2 (3) in
connection with the purchase or the sale of a security, 33 (4) upon which
the plaintiff reasonably relied3 4 and (5) the plaintiff's reliance was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.35
A somewhat recent development in Section 10(b) litigation includes
the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver.3 6 There, the Court eliminated any private claim against
professional advisers for aiding and abetting a securities fraud violation.
3 7
The plaintiff must show that a defendant actually engaged in manipulative
or deceptive acts or made fraudulent representations. 38 The effect of this
holding is that private plaintiffs must charge defendants as primary viola-
tors rather than secondary ones. 39 Nevertheless, Central Bank does not
preclude a secondary actor, such as an accounting firm that prepares a
fraudulent audit report, from facing liability under Section 10(b). 40
A. History of the Scienter Requirement's Development
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful to use or employ "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of SEC
31. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (defining something
as material under Rule lOb-5 actions when "there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making investment
decision).
32. See Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977) (not-
ing elements of Section 10(b) action include scienter). For a further discussion of
Coleco, see infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
33. See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 181 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting
that this element satisfies underlying purposes of Section 10(b) because it recog-
nizes "causal effect that material misrepresentations, which raise the public's inter-
est in particular securities, tend to have on the investment decisions of market
participants who trade in those securities").
34. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243-47 (discussing reliance requirement).
35. See id. at 242 (noting relationship between reliance and injury elements of
Rule 10b-5); see also, e.g., Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir.
1997) (noting these elements).
36. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
37. See id. at 191 (deciding that actors who do not commit manipulative or
deceptive acts within meaning of Section 10 (b) but who instead aid and abet viola-
tion are not liable under Section 10(b)).
38. See id. ("Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omis-
sion) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary
violator under 10b-5 .... ").
39. See Cramton, supra note 3, at 169 (noting that federal courts of appeals
are divided on whether primary liability reaches professional adviser (i.e., account-
ant) who stays in background approving fraudulent financial statement, but who
does not make misrepresentation in person, or whose name is not included in
document). For a further discussion of Central Bank and its relevance in Ikon, see
infra note 119 and accompanying text.
40. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 ("The absence of§ 10(b) aiding and abet-
ting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are
always free from liability .... ").
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rules. 4 1 Analyzing this language, the Court in Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder42
held that a private cause of action does not exist under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in the absence of scienter, "a mental state embracing an intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. '14 3 In finding the scienter require-
ment, the Court noted that "the words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in
conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b) was
intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct."4 4 Because the
Court in Hochfelder held that some element of scienter was necessary, 45
liability cannot be imposed for negligent conduct alone.46
The Court's holding in Hochfelder clearly signals that the scienter re-
quirement is satisfied where an accountant has an actual intent to defraud
the plaintiff or where an accountant has actual knowledge that the ac-
countant's statements are materially false. 47 While the Supreme Court left
open the question of whether allegations of "recklessness" satisfy the scien-
ter requirement, the federal courts of appeals, beginning with the Seventh
Circuit, have concluded that a defendant's reckless action satisfies the sci-
enter requirement. 48 Almost all circuits, including the Third Cir-
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
42. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
43. Id. at 193 n.12 (noting that accountants in Hochfelderhad been retained by
brokerage house to perform periodic audits and prepare annual reports; president
of brokerage firm had defrauded many investors whose securities were held in
nonexistent escrow accounts and thus investors sued accountants). The plaintiffs
claimed that the accountants did not perform appropriate accounting procedures,
which explained why the president's fraud went undetected. See id. at 189-90
(describing plaintiffs' theory of negligent nonfeasance).
44. Id. at 193 n.12 (noting that while recklessness is sometimes considered to
be intentional conduct, Court chose not to address whether reckless behavior is
sufficient for civil liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
45. See id. at 190 n.5 (concluding that accounting firm could not be held lia-
ble under Section 10(b) for conduct which plaintiff alleged to be "inexcusable
negligence").
46. See id. at 198-99 (emphasizing that in enacting 1934 Act Congress did not
intend to bar all such practices, only those done knowingly or intentionally); Her-
man & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1983) (noting that mere
negligence is insufficient to satisfy scienter requirement); see, e.g., McLean v. Alex-
ander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[N]egligence whether gross, grave or
inexcusable cannot serve as substitute for scienter.").
47. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549,
571 (S. D. Tex. 2002) (stating that misstatement or omission of material fact must
be made with scienter); see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (noting negligent
conduct may suffice); Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1998) (de-
fining scienter according to Hochfelder); Lovelance v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78
F.3d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1996) ("In order to adequately plead scienter, a plaintiff
must set forth specific facts to support an inference of fraud.").
48. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1046 (7th Cir.
1977) (rejecting defendant's argument that he did not act with scienter because he
lacked "actual knowledge of the danger" of misleading plaintiff). The court found
scienter because the "objective obviousness of the danger" adequately justified lia-
bility "even absent an actual appreciation [by defendant] of the significance of the
omitted material to [the plaintiff]." Id.
1334 [Vol. 48: p. 1329
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cuit,4 9 have followed suit.50 As the different circuits have defined "reck-
lessness," a variety of definitions have developed. 5 1 While all courts that
have decided this issue agree that recklessness is something more than
ordinary negligence, the precise standard varies. 52 Despite the wide range
of definitions, the most widely accepted approach to "recklessness" is the
Seventh Circuit's definition:
Reckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omis-
sion, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negli-
gence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it.
5 3
Although the scienter requirement necessitates a showing of deliber-
ate intent to mislead, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defen-
dant had a specific intent to defraud. 5 4 Accordingly, even where the
49. See Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977) (find-
ing for first time in Third Circuit that reckless conduct is actionable under Section
10(b)); see also SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 2000) (discuss-
ing effect of good faith on scienter requirement); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of
Pa., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980) (adding to Third Circuit's definition of reck-
lessness); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979) (attempting to
define legal standard for recklessness by adopting Seventh Circuit's standard ver-
batim). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's inclusion of recklessness
within the definition of scienter, see infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
50. See Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1534 (8th Cir. 1996)
(including recklessness within definition of scienter while simultaneously ac-
cepting Sunstrands limited definition of scienter); In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing recklessness, but requiring
"strong inference" of scienter as either facts establishing motive and opportunity to
commit fraud or facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or
conscious behavior); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (al-
lowing scienter to be proved through defendant's reckless actions that showed ex-
treme departure from standard of ordinary care and not merely heightened form
or ordinary care); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1562, 1569 (9th Cir.
1990) (viewing recklessness as form of intentional or knowing misconduct, stating:
"[r]ecklessness is a form of intent rather than a greater degree of negligence")
(citing Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 739 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th
Cir. 1984)); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814-15 (11 th Cir.
1989) (following "extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care" stan-
dard of recklessness) (quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62
(5th Cir. 1981)).
51. For a further discussion of the other definitions adopted by various cir-
cuits, see supra note 44-52 and accompanying text.
52. For a further discussion of differences in definitions, see supra notes 44-50
and accompanying text.
53. Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1045; see also 7 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3525-30 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that Sundstrand definition
has been characterized as "most widely followed approach" to defining reckless-
ness for these purposes).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370-71 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (stating that even in criminal case under
2003] CASEBRIEF 1335
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defendant is charged with "knowing misconduct," proof of intent to vio-
late the law is not a prerequisite to establishing scienter. 55 Most cases that
decide whether the scienter requirement was satisfied do so without in-
quiring into the defendant's perception of the materiality of the omitted
or misrepresented facts, 56 whether the defendant understood (or was
reckless in not recognizing) that the defendant's deception entailed a risk
of misleading the investor in a material way.
Courts generally infer recklessness or fraud from circumstantial evi-
dence. 57 Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence must show more than
mere negligence. 58 Thus, evidence such as expert testimony does not es-
tablish scienter because it only permits an inference that the actions of the
accountant were negligent or unreasonable.5 9 Another significant aspect
of the federal courts' approach to scienter is that while the application of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") 60 has led
securities laws, government must only prove that defendant intended to commit
prohibited act).
55. See SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that determination of knowing misconduct does not require examination of
defendant's subjective belief as to legality of his action). The Falstaff court stated:
Knowledge means awareness of the underlying facts, not the labels that
the law places on those facts. Except in very rare instances, no area of the
law-not even the criminal law-demands that a defendant have thought
his actions were illegal. A knowledge of what one is doing and the conse-
quences of those actions suffices. We therefore hold that because [defen-
dant] knew the nature and consequences of his actions, he acted with
scienter.
Id.
56. See Allan Horwich, The Neglected Relationship of Materiality and Recklessness in
Actions under Rule lOb-5, 55 Bus. LAw. 1023, 1024 (2000) (mentioning that Third
Circuit has suggested that "a defendant's 'appreciation of the consequences' of his
conduct is part of the scienter analysis in an appropriate case"). But see Pittsburgh
Terminal Corp. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933, 943 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding
that scienter is established where defendants "know the materiality of the con-
cealed information and intend the consequences of concealment"). For a further
discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of scienter, see infra notes 70-103.
57. See Herman v. MacLean, 459 U.S. 375, 390-91 n.30 (1983) (noting that
circumstantial evidence can be "more than sufficient" to prove scienter in fraud
cases); see also Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that jury could infer either recklessness or actual knowledge of fraud
where accountants' own audit working papers indicated that they either were
aware that provision for uncollectible accounts was insufficient or purposefully
avoided in determining whether account was sufficient).
58. See In reWorlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating evidence of reasonable decisions "negates the plaintiffs' attempt to estab-
lish scienter").
59. See id. at 1425-27 (holding that auditor did not act with scienter; "self-
righteous statements" or plaintiffs' expert were not sufficient to prove anything
beyond negligence).
60. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77z-1 (1995)); H.R. CONF. No. 104-369, at 31, 41 (1995) (noting that PSLRA was
enacted to reduce volume of non-meritorious federal securities lawsuits by erecting
procedural barriers, namely, heightened pleading requirements for Rule 10b-5
claims); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2003) (noting that pleading standards
1336
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to varying interpretations among the federal courts of appeals of what
plaintiffs must plead in order to demonstrate scienter,61 most courts have
held that the PSLRA did not alter the scienter requirements under Section
10(b). 6 2
Turning to the scienter requirement specifically in accountant liabil-
ity cases (as opposed to the broad spectrum of all securities fraud cases
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5), the federal courts have also held
that failure to follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles631
("GAAP") and Generally Accepted Accounting Standards64 ("GAAS")
now include requirement that complaint "state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind").
61. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.
1999) ("[A] private securities plaintiff proceeding under the PSLRA must plead, in
great detail, facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately
reckless or conscious misconduct."); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542,
550 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that "plaintiff may survive a motion to dismiss by
pleading facts that give rise to a 'strong inference' of recklessness"); In re Advanta
Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that plaintiff may
establish requisite inference of fraudulent intent by alleging either "facts 'establish-
ing a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting forth facts that
constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior"')
(quoting Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997)); Press v.
Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff can
plead scienter by "either (a) alleg[ing] facts to show that 'defendants had both
motive and opportunity to commit fraud' or (b) alleg[ing] facts that 'constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness"') (quoing
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)).
62. See In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550 ("The PSLRA did not disturb the well-
settled understanding that 'scienter' is the requisite mental state for liability under
§ 10b or Rule 10b-5 cases."); In reAdvanta, 180 F.3d at 534 (stating that PSLRA was
only intended to modify procedural requirements of pleading, and that it left sub-
stantive law of securities fraud actions untouched); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL &
SAMUEL WOLFF, EMERGINc TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAw 7 (2001) (noting that Second
and Third Circuit deemed PSLRA standard as remaining same as pre-PSLRA stan-
dard and that Sixth and Eleventh Circuits agree to some extent with Second and
Third Circuits in that recklessness is appropriate basis for alleging and proving
scienter). The Ninth Circuit's standard is the most demanding in that recklessness
must reach the level of deliberate recklessness before scienter is proved and that
motive and opportunity alone are not sufficient for drawing an inference of scien-
ter. See id. (noting high standard to prove scienter in Ninth Circuit). The Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits agree with the Ninth Circuit in that motive and opportunity
alone are not a stifficient basis for pleading scienter. See id. (comparing reasoning
of circuit courts).
63. See SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 n.17 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (explaining GAAP represents "basic postulates and broad principles of ac-
counting pertaining to business enterprises, approved by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts
('AICPA')). These principles establish guidelines for measuring, recording, and
classifying the transactions of a business entity").
64. See id. (noting GAAS are "standards prescribed by the Auditing Standards
Board of the AICPA for the conduct of auditors in the performance of an examina-
tion"); see also Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1372 n.2 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) ("GAAS and GAAP delineate due professional care owed by accountants
to their clients as stated by the accounting community.").
2003] 1337
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alone does not establish scienter.6 5 Nevertheless, compliance with GAAP
"will not immunize an accountant if he consciously [chooses] not to dis-
close a known material fact." 66 Essentially, there is no liability under Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for ordinary professional malpractice. 6 7 An
accountant's error in judgment or failure to adequately investigate a mat-
ter is generally regarded as a negligence claim and is not actionable under
Rule lOb-5.68 But an inference of scienter may, however, be strengthened
should the accountant have a motive to defraud. 69
65. See Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 430 n.12 (5th Cir. 2002)
(explaining effect of GAAP on scienter determination). The Abrams court stated:
[T]he mere publication of inaccurate accounting figures or failure to fol-
low GAAP, without more, does not establish scienter; a plaintiff must
show that the accounting firm deliberately misrepresented material facts
or acted with reckless disregard about the accuracy of its audits or re-
ports. The party must know that it is publishing materially false informa-
tion, or must be severely reckless in publishing such information.
Id.; see also United States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding
fundamental question is not compliance with GAAP but one of "honesty and good
faith"); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming convic-
tions of three accountants for securities and wire fraud even though accounting
experts testified that accountants' certification of client's financial statements was
in full compliance with GAAP). Technical compliance with GAAP is relevant but
not conclusive evidence of the accountants' good faith. See id. at 806. ("Such evi-
dence may be highly persuasive, but is not conclusive .... "); Zucker v. Sasaki, 963
F. Supp. 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that general allegations of GAAP viola-
tions do not satisfy scienter requirement).
66. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1313 n.15 (9th Cir. 1982); Contra
id. (stating that "accountant has no duty beyond compliance [with GAAP]").
67. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("[S]ecurities laws do not impose liability for ordinary malpractice.").
68. See Wells v. Monarch Capital Corp., No. 97-1221, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
30031, at *21 (1st Cir. Oct. 29, 1997) (concluding that while accountants involved
in case may have made mistake, such mistakes do not support finding of scienter);
Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(noting that use of particular language was no more than error in judgment not
rising beyond level of negligence); cf. Simon, 425 F.2d at 806-07 (discussing ac-
countant's duty when accountant detects impropriety). The Simon court stated
that general accounting principles:
[I]nstruct an accountant what to do in the usual case where he has no
reason to doubt that the affairs of the corporation are being honestly
conducted. Once he has reason to believe that this basic assumption is
false, an entirely different situation confronts him. Then . . . he must
"extend his procedures to determine whether or not such suspicions are
justified." If as a result [of further inquiry] he finds his suspicions to be
confirmed, full disclosure must be the rule, unless he has made sure the
wrong has been righted and procedures to avoid a repetition have been
established,
Id.
69. Cf Barker, 797 F.2d at 497 (stating that "the court should ask whether the
fraud (or cover-up) was in the interest of the [accountants]").
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT
A. Third Circuit Precedent Prior to In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder, the Third Cir-
cuit in Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Berman, 7 1 like many other circuits, held that
reckless conduct is actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5's scien-
ter requirement.7 1 Nevertheless, the debate regarding scienter was not
over as the court in Coleco chose not to define the precise level of reckless-
ness that it will allow to show scienter. 72 In McLean v. Alexander,73 the
court attempted to define the legal standard for recklessness, but McLean
did not solve all of the problems concerning scienter.74
McLean is an accountant liability case in which the plaintiff alleged
that Cashman & Schiavi ("C&S"), a firm of certified public accountants,
recklessly represented in an audited balance sheet that the corporation at
issue had legitimate sales when in fact the underlying transactions were
merely consignments. 75 Because the accountants claimed that they acted
in good faith, the court had to determine the necessary degree of culpabil-
70. 567 F.2d 569, 571-73 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting case dealt with Coleco Corpo-
ration's acquisition of Royal Corporation and Coleco's claim that figures on
Coleco's balance sheet were misstated, leading to Rule 1Ob-5 violation). The Royal
defendants contended that the figures were made in good faith. See id. at 572
(arguing defendants were misled by errors of accountant). The court held that
there was no violation of Rule 10b-5 because plaintiffs failed to prove scienter. See
id. at 579 (explaining plaintiffs had no valid claim because plaintiffs could not
prove defendants' misrepresentations were recklessly made or made with fraudu-
lent intent).
71. See id. at 574 (stating that scienter element in Section 10(b) case required
"a conscious deception or . . .a misrepresentation so recklessly made that the
culpability attaching to such reckless conduct closely approaches that which at-
taches to conscious deception") (citing Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp.
275, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
72. See id. (noting that Third Circuit in Coleco chose not to "precisely define"
legal standard for recklessness).
73. 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
74. See id. at 1197-98 (noting that court adopted Seventh Circuit's standard
for determining liability under Section 10(b) in court's attempt to "precisely de-
fine the legal standard for recklessness").
75. See id. at 1196 (noting that plaintiff, McLean, engaged in large stock
purchase of Technidyne stock, relying on audited balance sheet prepared by C&S,
which included false representations of Technidyne's past sales and future sales
potential). Once McLean realized that he had been defrauded, he and others
sued C&S. See id. at 1194 (stressing McLean's reliance on sales figures as factor in
his purchase of Technidyne stock). The trial court found that the only figure on
the balance sheet that was false or misleading was the accounts receivable figure.
See id. at 1195 (explaining that McLean viewed accounts receivable figure as repre-
senting almost entirely accounts due and owing as result of sixteen recent sales);
see also Scor A. TAUB, 2003 MILLER GAAP GUIDE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: REVENUE
RECOGNITION § 5.13-5.14 (2003) (explaining that for accounting purposes, ship-
ment of goods on consignment does not constitute sale, and thus there should be
no recognition of income). In general, "[a] shipment of goods 'on consignment'
generally indicates that payment is expected only upon resale or use of the prod-
uct by the purchaser and that unsold items may be returned to the seller ... title
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ity to implicate Rule 10b-5 liability.76 The court held that C&S did not
have the requisite level for scienter under Section 10(b). 77 Specifically,
the court stated:
There was no evidence that Schiavi, the C&S partner in charge of
the audit, had actual knowledge of the consignment arrange-
ments, or even that he was aware of the risk that they were con-
signment sales. Thus, C&S could be held to have the requisite
scienter only if the investigation it made, and the knowledge it
had, gave rise to an inference that "it must have been aware" of
the risk that the accounts receivable item was misleading.78
In making this determination, the Third Circuit adopted the Seventh
Circuit's test for recklessness, reiterating that liability under Section 10(b)
requires "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care." 79
The court in McLean further stated that to demonstrate scienter "the
plaintiff [must] establish that the defendant lacked a genuine belief that
the information disclosed was accurate and complete in all material re-
spects. "'80 This standard emphasizes that some sort of knowledge or aware-
ness is required before the Third Circuit will find scienter. One reason
the Third Circuit decided to adopt the Seventh Circuit standard of reck-
lessness was because it preserves the standards of scienter in the context of
accountant liability that were developed by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares
generally does not pass until the purchaser resells the inventory to its customer."
Id.
76. See McLean, 599 F.2d at 1196 (stating issue of case as "whether the ac-
countant proceeded in a deliberate, knowing or reckless manner in the prepara-
tion of his audit").
77. See id. at 1199 (stating that there were inconsistencies in Technidyne's
documentation that should have put C&S on notice that items Technidyne
claimed as sales were only consignments). The court stated: "[i]f we were applying
a negligence standard we could affirm a finding that ... [C&S] should have made
further inquiry of managementt... before concluding that the accounts receivable
was genuine." Id. at 1199-1200. Nevertheless, the court noted that this neglect
does not alone suggest that C&S was aware that it was without sufficient knowledge
to form its audit opinion. See id. at 1200 (requiring more than neglect to prove
scienter). To so hold "would obliterate the distinction between tortious conduct
requiring scienter ... and negligence." Id.
78. Id. at 1199 (stating that C&S did not act recklessly). The court noted,
"[t]he accountant examined purchase orders and invoices which appeared genu-
ine, received representations from management, took steps to obtain confirmation
from the account debtors, and received partial confirmation of 15 of the 16 sales
centrally in issue." Id. at 1202.
79. Id. at 1197 (quoting Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1045 (7th Cir. 1977)). The court noted that even though the Seventh Circuit only
applied this standard to omissions, the Third Circuit thought that it also applied to
misstatements. See id. (looking at reasoning of Seventh Circuit). For a further
discussion of the Sundstrand test, see supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
80. McLean, 599 F.2d at 1198 (noting further, in strong language, that "negli-
gence whether gross, grave or inexcusable cannot serve as substitute for scienter").
1340 [Vol. 48: p. 1329
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Corp. v. Touche,8' namely, that an accountant is guilty of fraud upon "a
showing that a misrepresentation was made knowingly or willfully, or with
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, or without a 'genuine belief' in its
truth."8 2 This deference demonstrates the Third Circuit's continued re-
quirement of proof that accountants act intentionally before the court will
find scienter, a very high level of recklessness. 83  Accordingly, McLean
demonstrates that a finding of negligence, no matter how gross, will never
satisfy the Third Circuit's scienter requirement.8 4
The McLean court's strong language sets the Third Circuit's strict
tone, suggesting that plaintiffs will have to make a strong showing in order
to prove scienter. 85 Nevertheless, the court stated that circumstantial evi-
dence showing essentially a reckless disregard for the truth may ade-
quately prove scienter:
To prove scienter the plaintiff need not produce direct evidence
of the defendant's state of mind. Circumstantial evidence may
often be the principal, if not the only, means of proving bad
81. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 (1931) (noting that defendants, public accountants,
were hired to prepare and certify balance sheet and although accountants certified
various accounts as accurate, accounts had, in fact, been wiped out and business
was insolvent). The court found that if defendants had made statements as true
without knowledge on the subject, they could be liable for fraud. See id. (explain-
ing that verification is essential function of accountant); see also McLean, 599 F.2d
at 1198 (quoting O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1937)). The court
in McLean also references another application of the early common law scienter
requirement in deciding whether accountants are guilty of fraud:
[The] issue [is] whether the defendants had an honest belief that the
statements made by them were true. If they did have that honest belief,
whether reasonably or unreasonably, they are not liable. If they did not
have an honest belief in the truth of their statements, then they are liable,
so far as [scienter] is concerned.
O'Connor, 92 F.2d at 54.
82. McLean, 599 F.2d at 1198 (citing Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179-89); see also id.
at 1200 (failing to make further inquiry even in light of circumstances that suggest
further inquiry is necessary (i.e., discrepancies between due dates on inventories)
does not rise beyond level of negligence because this does not indicate that "C&S
knew that it lacked the knowledge required to form an opinion" regarding
Technidyne's sales).
83. See id. at 1198 (reiterating that "negligence whether gross, grave or inex-
cusable cannot serve as substitute for scienter").
84. See id. at 1198 (stating that purpose of Hochfelder's footnote 12 (where
court did not decide question of whether recklessness satisfies Rule 10b-5 scien-
ter's requirement) was to preserve "the standards of scienter developed in Ul-
tramares"); see also Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179 ("If liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the
cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indetermi-
nate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.").
85. See McLean, 599 F.2d at 1199 (noting Third Circuit's tough rhetoric when
it stated that "C&S could be held to have the necessary scienter only if the evidence
supports an inference that when it expressed the opinion it had no genuine belief
that it had the information on which it could predicate that opinion") (emphasis
added).
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faith. A showing of shoddy accounting practices amounting at
best to a "pretended audit," or of grounds supporting a represen-
tation "so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no
genuine belief back of it" have traditionally supported a finding
of liability in the face of repeated assertions of good faith .... 86
The Third Circuit further clarified its position regarding scienter in
Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc.87 There, the court stated
that the level of recklessness that will satisfy the Section 10(b) scienter
requirement is closer to intentional conduct rather than any "indifference
to the consequences."8 8 This emphasizes the stringent definition of reck-
lessness that the Third Circuit accepts. 8 9 The Third Circuit further de-
fined its position regarding recklessness, specifically in accountant liability
contexts. 90 The court stated that "mistakes in accounting calculations, un-
reasonable accounting procedures, or even outright violations of profes-
sional standards, without more, simply do not establish scienter."9 '
Moreover, malpractice alone does not amount to fraud.92 Regarding an
attempt to find scienter from an expressed opinion, the Third Circuit
86. Id. at 1198 (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1045 (7th Cir. 1977)) (demonstrating difficulty in proving scienter, court stated
that "the inquiries of management, the awareness of [past practices], and the par-
tial telegraphic confirmation simply cannot be characterized as 'grounds . . . so
flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of
[C&S's] representation to that effect").
87. 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that minority shareholder sued
on grounds that he was denied material information that precluded him from en-
joining merger; by analyzing elements of cause of action under Rule 10b-5, court
held that plaintiffs claim constituted cause of action under Rule lOb-5). The
court held that there was sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to the
defendants' scienter because the defendants knew the plaintiff's requests for alleg-
edly material information had not been complied with. See id. at 650 (noting evi-
dence on scienter under relevant standard).
88. Id. (rejectingjury instructions defining recklessness under Rule lOb-5 as
one done with "indifference to the consequences"). The court also stated that
"Sundstrand was a proper reading of Ernst & Ernst because it defined recklessness
as being relatively close to intentional conduct." Id.
89. See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 131 F. Supp. 2d 680, 692
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (referring to rhetoric in Healey).
90. See id. (exploring duties of accountant).
91. Id. (citing In reWorlds of Wonder, 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994)); see
also In re Bell At. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CIV.A. 91-0514, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4938,
at *114 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 1997) ("The mere publication of inaccurate accounting
figures, or a failure to follow GAAP without more, does not establish scienter.").
92. See id. (citing Quest Med. Group, Inc. v. Kirschner Med. Corp., No. CIV.A.
90-858, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14597, *13 (D. Md. July 29, 1992)) ("'If an account-
ing firm could be charged with fraud every time that its audit did not conform to
[GAAP], then every claim of malpractice would also constitute a claim of fraud."')
(quoting E. F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., v. Pappas, 690 F. Supp. 1465, 1471 (D. Md.
1988)).
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stated that demonstrating after the fact that an opinion turned out to be
incorrect does not give rise to scienter. 93
In SEC v. Infinity Group Co.,94 the Third Circuit further examined the
effect of good faith on the Section 10(b) scienter requirement. 9 5 In this
case, investors in the Infinity Group Company Trust ("TIGC") charged
that the creators of the trust ran an ongoing scheme to defraud public
investors through the offer and sale of TIGC securities.9 6 The defendants
claimed that because "they sincerely believed in the investments that TIGC
made," the SEC failed to establish the scienter requirement of Section
10(b).9 7 The Third Circuit explained that one may still be guilty of a Sec-
tion 10(b) violation even though one has a good faith belief that one
made true representations.9 8 In other words, "[a] good faith belief is not
a 'get out ofjail free card.' It will not insulate the defendants from liability
if it is the result of reckless conduct."9 9
The court noted that the evidence in Infinity Group made the defend-
ants' guilt fairly obvious, despite claims that they always acted in good
93. See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing
issues of restrospection). The Eisenberg court noted:
In establishing scienter with respect to projections and opinions, it is in-
sufficient to show mere negligent conduct or that a forecast turned out to
be inaccurate. However, . . . an opinion must not be made with reckless
disregard for its truth or falsity, or with a lack of a genuine belief that the
information disclosed was accurate and complete in all material respects.
Therefore, an opinion that has been issued without a genuine belief or
reasonable basis is an 'untrue' statement which, if made knowingly or
recklessly, is culpable conduct actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Rule lOb-5.
Id.; see also Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., 24 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that
opinion that is decidedly untrue and issued recklessly could be susceptible to liabil-
ity under Section 10(b)).
94. 212 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2000).
95. See id. at 192 (holding that good faith "does not necessarily preclude a
finding of recklessness").
96. See id. at 185 (noting that operators of TIGC invested less than half of
money solicited from public investors and failed to disclose to investors mounting
losses; instead operators used at least $3.5 million of approximately $26.6 million
invested for their personal home, new Mercedes Benz, household expenses, son's
education, jewelry and bowling equipment). Because of the securities fraud, the
plaintiffs succeeded in persuading the lower court to grant a permanent injunc-
tion enjoining defendants from further violations of securities laws. See id. at 186
(summarizing lower court's ruling).
97. Id. at 192 (noting that on appeal SEC maintained that TIGC's scienter was
evidenced by TIGC's guarantees of high rates of return that were unsupported by
any honest due diligence).
98. See id. at 192 (noting that "even if the defendants believed TIGC's invest-
ments were sound, they may still be liable for securities fraud if their belief was
based upon nothing more than a reckless disregard of the truth").
99. Id. at 193 (reiterating that good faith belief may still accompany finding of
recklessness and that "ignorance provides no defense to recklessness where a rea-
sonable investigation would have revealed the truth to the defendant").
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faith. 1 ' Alluding to McLean, the court stated that if an opinion is based
on materials when the "circumstances suggest that they cannot be relied
on without further inquiry, then the failure to investigate further may 'sup-
port[ ] an inference that when [the defendant] expressed the opinion it
had no genuine belief that it had the information on which it could predi-
cate that opinion."'10 1 Translated into the accounting context, the court's
words suggest that when an accounting firm turns a blind eye to materials
whose veracity is questionable, it may nevertheless predicate a finding of
scienter. 102
This evolution of the scienter requirement, beginning with Coleco in
1977 to Infinity Group in 2000, set the tone for the Third Circuit's rather
demanding scienter standard, establishing that even gross negligence will
not give rise to scienter. 10 3 By 2002, the Third Circuit was prepared to
further define the Section 10(b) scienter requirement.
B. In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc.
1. Facts and Procedural History
Ernst was retained as Ikon's auditor for fiscal year 1997; the accuracy
of Ernst's audit opinion for that year was the central issue in the case. 10 4
On October 15, 1997, Ikon issued a press release reporting fourth-quarter
and year-end results.' 0 5 Most significantly, Ikon noted a fifteen percent
rise over fiscal 1996 in income from continuing operations.11 6 Then, on
December 24, 1997, Ernst issued its unqualified audit opinion, 0 7 stating
that Ikon's 1997 financial statements fairly reflected its financial
position. I'
100. See id. at 194-95 (noting that defendants did not take steps to ensure that
their investments were legitimate, such as obtaining certified financial statements
from programs in which it invested, determining whether programs were insured,
obtaining legal opinions and certificates of good standing).
101. Id. at 194 (quoting McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir.
1979)).
102. For a further discussion of the meaning of scienter in the accounting
context, see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
103. See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir.
1980) (noting that scienter is similar to intentional conduct).
104. See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir.
2002) (noting that Ernst had served as Ikon's independent outside auditor for
number of years prior to 1997). The fiscal year ended on September 30. See id. at
662-63 (defining applicable fiscal year).
105. See id. (stating that Ernst reviewed press release before it was issued but
did not propose any modifications).
106. See id. (reporting income from continuing operations totaling $204.9
million for fiscal 1997).
107. See id. at 664 n.4 (explaining that unqualified audit opinion is "the high-
est level of assurance that an auditor can give on an organization's financial state-
ments ... [a]ccountants will 'qualify' their opinion where discrepancies are
identified in a client's financial statements").
108. See id. (following issuance of Ernst's unqualified audit opinion, share val-
ues of Ikon common stock increased in value).
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Nevertheless, on April 22, 1998, Ikon announced that its second quar-
ter earnings for fiscal year 1998 would not meet published estimates and
that third and fourth quarter earnings would likely fall below expecta-
tions. 10 9 In response to this report, Ikon's stock experienced a one-day
decline of 27.08 percent-dropping from $34.625 to $25.250 by clos-
ing." I" As more reports stating that Ikon would not meet its earnings esti-
mates were made public, the stock continued to decline; byJune 29, 1998,
the shares of Ikon common stock closed at $15.31.111
In response, Ikon hired Ernst to review'all the significant account bal-
ances on certain Ikon units, a project known as the "Special Proce-
dures."11 2 To review Ernst's work on the Special Procedures and Ernst's
work on the 1997 audit, Ikon also hired Andersen.1 13 Following the con-
clusion of the Special Procedures, Ikon announced a $110 million down-
ward adjustment to earnings which included a $94 million reduction in
pre-tax charges applied to its 1998 third quarter earnings and a restate-
ment of its previously reported and unaudited 1998 second quarter earn-
ings to reflect $16 million in pre-tax charges.1 14
Plaintiffs-appellants were representatives of a certified class consisting
of all persons who purchased common stock, convertible preferred stock
or call options of Ikon between the October press release announcing
year-end results and the announcement of the Special Procedures restate-
ments. 115 They brought this action initially against Ikon and certain indi-
vidual defendants related to it.116 Soon thereafter appellants amended
their complaint, adding Ernst as a defendant. 117 The complaint alleged
that the 1997 financial statements overstated pre-tax income and that,
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Ernst knew or must have been aware
of these overstatements when it issued its unqualified audit opinion with
109. See id. at 664 (noting that although Ikon cited many reasons for lowered
earnings, Ikon did not mention accounting charges to rectify discrepancies in its
1997 financial statements).
110. See id. (explaining drastic market reaction following issuance of report).
111. See id. (stating that by mid-August Ikon was trading at $9.31 per share).
112. See id. (noting that project involved reviewing books of each of Ikon's
North American and United Kingdom business services).
113. See id. (permitting Andersen to review all work papers from Ernst's 1997
audit, Ikon's first and second limited 1998 quarterly reviews and Special
Procedures).
114. See id. at 684-85 (noting that $110 million in charges specifically included
$28 million to cover defaults on leases, $20 million for unpaid accounts receivable,
$35 million for adjustments due to internal controls failures at four operating
units, $20 million due to asset impairment and $7 million in miscellaneous
adjustments).
115. See id. at 662 (defining class of plaintiffs).
116. See id. (outlining claim).
117. See id. at 665 (stating that in November 1999 Ikon defendants settled
with plaintiff class for $111 million).
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respect to those statements.1 18 The plaintiffs also claimed that Ernst was
reckless in failing to discover deficiencies in Ikon's financial statements in
connection with Ikon's October 15, 1997 press release.' 19
The Ikon defendants settled with the plaintiff class for $111 mil-
lion. 120 As the only remaining defendant, Ernst filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment.' 2 ' The district court entered judgment in Ernst's favor,
stating that plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show a loss
due to the allegedly fraudulent misstatements and, as particularly notewor-
thy here, that plaintiffs failed to make the requisite showing of scienter.122
The shareholders appealed the district court's decision.12 3 The Third Cir-
cuit affirmed, concluding that Ernst did not recklessly or knowingly issue a
materially false and misleading audit opinion after reviewing Ikon's 1997
year-end financial statements.
1 24
118. See id. (alluding that Ernst harbored intent to deceive or acted with reck-
less disregard for accuracy of Ikon's financial disclosures). This complaint also
brought up the issue of causation; namely, whether Ikon's corrective accounting
disclosures caused Ikon's stock price to drop. See id. at 662 (outlining allegation
against Ernst).
119. See id. at 668 n.8 (noting that issue turns on interpretation of Central
Bank's repudiation of aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 10(b)). The
Third Circuit reiterated the district court's decision that because Ikon's press re-
lease neither mentioned Ernst by name nor attributed any representations to
Ernst, to hold Ernst liable for representations in a press release would be contrary
to Central Bank. See id. at 667-68 (referencing precedent in finding that Ernst can-
not be liable for contents of press release). Essentially, Ernst "at best facilitated the
principal actor's disclosures, and therefore, did not 'make' a material misstate-
ment." Id. Although seeming to agree with the district court, the Third Circuit
chose not to address this issue because doing so would involve determining
whether the "substantial participation" test adopted by other courts violates Central
Bank. See id. (explaining Third Circuit's avoidance of "material misstatement"
issue).
120. See id. at 665 (describing procedural history).
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that summary judgment shall be granted
if pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as matter of law); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (concluding that at summaryjudgment stage
court does not weigh evidence for veracity, but determines whether or not there is
genuine issue for trial).
122. See Ikon, 277 F.3d at 668 (noting that district court also entered partial
summary judgment in Ernst's favor for period between October 15 press release
and Ernst's annotncement of its audit opinion, in which plaintiff class based its
theory of liability on Ikon's press release).
123. See id. at 661-62 (specifying stage of litigation).
124. See id. (noting that because appellants failed to show scienter, their Sec-
tion 10(b) claim failed and court did not have to reach issue of causation).
1346 [Vol. 48: p. 1329
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2. Defining the Contours of the Scienter Requirement in Accountant Liability
Litigation
In affirming the district court on scienter grounds, the Third Circuit
essentially established an "egregious accountant" standard.1 25 The court
did not go as far as developing an entirely new standard under which to
determine accountant liability so much as it synthesized the Third Cir-
cuit's prior decisions into one standard. 126 The court stated:
To give rise to section 10(b) liability for fraud, . . . appellants
must show that Ernst's judgment-at the moment exercised-
was sufficiently egregious such that a reasonable accountant re-
viewing the facts and figures should have concluded that IKON's
financial statements were misstated and that as a result the public
was likely to be misled.127
This emphasis on viewing an accountant's conduct "at the moment exer-
cised" demonstrates that the Third Circuit seeks to avoid holding the ac-
countant to a higher standard merely because, in hindsight, the
accountant's conduct appears more egregious.' 28 Because much of the
litigation against accounting firms results because shareholders need to
find a deep pocket after the fact, this stance is particularly advantageous
for the accounting profession. 129 By eliminating hindsight from the scien-
ter equation, accountants are less likely to be found in violation of securi-
ties laws.130
This standard also involves asking whether a similarly situated ac-
countant would have reached the same results as the accountant in ques-
tion.1 31 The court gave considerable deference to the fact that Andersen,
a reasonable accountant, and even a market rival, did review the financials
125. See id. ("[A]ppellants must show that Ernst's judgment-at the moment
exercised-was sufficiently egregious").
126. See id. at 673 (stating standard).
127. Id. at 673.
128. See id. (citing Denny v. Barkber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978)). The
Second Circuit rejected "fraud by hindsight" because the law does not demand
clairvoyance. See id. (rejecting fraud claims beyond those where scienter is found
at time of act in question). The Second Circuit stated: "[t]he claim that appel-
lants' experts, in retrospect, would have compared assets against balance sheets on
a monthly basis . . . does not illustrate that Ernst's incongruous auditing tactics
were unjustified, let alone reflected an intent to defraud or rash disregard for the
likelihood of deception." Id. at 676; see also McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190,
1199 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasizing that scienter could only be found if at moment
accounting firm "expressed the opinion" it did not believe in truth of its expres-
sion, indicating Third Circuit's similar distrust of hindsight as factor in accountant
liability cases).
129. See Ikon, 277 F.3d at 673 (forming Third Circuit standard to which ac-
countants must conform).
130. See id. (same).
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and "found nothing that 'would be a significant issue' regarding the qual-
ity of Ernst's opinion." 13 2 Nevertheless, the court established that Ander-
sen's similar finding did not completely shield Ernst from liability.'
33
From there, the court recognized the fact-specific nature of determin-
ing scienter (or in this case, of determining whether a genuine issue of
material fact regarding scienter existed) and launched into an accurate
and probing analysis of the specific allegations raised by the appellants.
134
Among other arguments, the appellants claimed that Ernst deliberately
disregarded a warning from an Ikon officer that Ikon employees were be-
ing forced to deceptively boost income.' 35 The court dismissed this claim
because it felt that Ernst responded appropriately to this allegation by no-
tifying Ikon management of the claim and by encouraging Ikon to hire
independent counsel to investigate. 136 The court reasoned, "[t]he mere
fact that Ernst did not conduct its own fraud investigation or alert its field
auditors to the allegations of fraud is not probative, as the relevant inquiry
is bad faith, not judgment."1 3 7 Thus, in the Third Circuit, evidence of a
failure to investigate a red flag is insufficient to support the scienter re-
quirement, especially where the accountant has otherwise acted
reasonably. 138
The appellants also claimed that a checklist made during the plan-
ning stage of the 1997 audit where Ernst noted risk factors resulting from
Ikon management's preference for favorable earnings raised an inference
of scienter sufficient to survive this summary judgment motion.' 3 9 The
court dismissed this claim in quick fashion, stating that if the scienter re-
132. See id. at 669 (noting that various Andersen partners declared that Ernst
did not appear to have done anything wrong).
133. See id. ("Andersen's conclusions do not provide cover categorically to in-
sulate Ernst from liability .... ").
134. See In Re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 131 F.Supp. 2d 680, 692
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that scienter is so fact-specific that it is often left to trier of
fact to decide).
135. See Ikon, 277 F.3d at 670 (noting that court also dismissed allegations that
Ikon's CFO had been "cooking the books").
136. See id. (noting that this evidence, which addresses concerns raised late in
1998, is not at all connected to any manipulations that could have occurred in
Ernst's preparation of its 1997 audit opinion, and thus suggests Ernst did not de-
part from standards of ordinary care).
137. Id. (concluding that this allegation did not raise material dispute of fact
on which to base finding of scienter).
138. See id. at 676 (noting that even where Ernst possibly erred in eliminating
intercompany earnings from pre-tax earnings, "an inference of recklessness ...
that otherwise might be drawn cannot survive the fact that Ernst thoroughly re-
viewed and tested Ikon's intercompany balances").
139. See id. at 671 (delineating where Ernst checked "yes" for presence of risk
factors, such as "unduly aggressive earnings targets" and "excessive interest in
maintaining or increasing Ikon's stock price"). The appellants contend that this
checklist demonstrates that Ernst knew about the pressure Ikon put on its employ-
ees to take drastic measures to reach profit goals and stock price maximization. See
id. (summarizing appellants' allegations).
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quirement could be satisfied by arguing that a company defrauded the
public because an inflated stock price would increase its compensation,
then "virtually every company in the United States that experiences a
downturn in stock would be forced to defend securities fraud actions."'140
Moreover, this was merely a checklist created in the early stages of the
audit, which if anything "tends to corroborate Ernst's diligence in con-
ducting the 1997 audit." 41
Additionally, the Third Circuit did not appreciate the appellants' ef-
forts in picking apart the 1997 audit in order to find scienter.142 The
court stated that a fishing expedition for isolated errors in a post-audit
hunt does not alone support a finding of intentional deceit or of reckless-
ness. 143 Put simply, the "mere second-guessing of calculations will not suf-
fice."' 14 4 Auditors are only expected to express an opinion on the fairness
with which management presents its financial position-auditors are not
guarantors of anything. 14 5 Expectations of "flawless levels of professional
care and judgment" are groundless. 146 Rather, to demonstrate Section
10(b) liability for fraud, the appellants would need to prove that "Ernst
harbored an intent to deceive or exhibited a reckless disregard for the
likelihood of fraud by exercising divergent, but nevertheless principled,
methodologies in auditing Ikon's financial statements."'147
Likewise, the appellants claimed that Ernst had actual knowledge of
$20.8 million in understatements in Ikon's financial statements when it
issued its audit opinion; the court stated this claim was unfounded.148
The court explained that the appellants derived the $20.8 million figure
from their own vision as to how the audit should have been conducted,
140. Id. (quoting Acito v. IMECERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir.
1995)) (foreseeing consequences if scienter requirement could be met so easily).
141. Id. (referencing auditor's duty to determine whether management is try-
ing to defraud public by misstating financial statements); see also P. Schoenfeld
Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 607 (D.N.J. 2001)
(same).
142. See Ikon, 277 F.3d at 672 (rejecting appellants' contention that deficien-
cies in Ikon's internal controls, of which Ernst was aware, support inference of
recklessness sufficient to support finding of scienter).
143. See id. at 673 (emphasizing that hindsight does not support finding of
scienter).
144. Id. (anticipating that reasonable accountants may have different findings
regarding accuracy of financial statements).
145. See id. ("An audit does not guarantee that a client's accounts and finan-
cial statements are correct any more than a sanguine medical diagnosis guarantees
well-being.").
146. La Rosa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 943 (3d Cir. 1968); see also
Ikon, 277 F.3d at 673 (stating that even perfectly conducted audit "countenances
some degree of calibration for tolerable error, which on occasion, may result in a
failure to detect a material omission or misstatement").
147. Ikon, 277 F.3d at 673 (noting that Ernst did not meet "this demanding
threshold").
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which amounted to nothing more than mere second-guessing, an invalid
ground for scienter. 149 Overall, the court gave substantial weight to the
fact that "Ernst took reasonable steps to ensure the adequacy" of all Ikon
accounts and that there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. 150
IV. A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS ON THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF
SECTION 10(b)'s SCIENTER REQUIREMENT
Given the aforementioned precedent, it is going to be difficult for
practitioners to successfully prove scienter in the Third Circuit.1 5 1 The
egregious accountant standard adopted by the Third Circuit appreciates
the fact that GAAP is not an equation that, when applied to a scenario, will
always yield the same result. 152 Because the Third Circuit recognizes that
accounting is more like an art than a science, the court anticipates that
two reasonable accountants will likely come up with two different results in
conducting various aspects of an audit.1 53 Accordingly, this court's analy-
sis demonstrates that the practitioner should not hope to succeed in a
securities claim against an accountant just by showing that one account-
149. See id. (noting appellants' contention that $20.8 million included $4.2
million understatement in lease default reserve account did not rise to level of
scienter according to court). The court stated that appellants purported to dis-
cern Ernst's culpable state of mind from a draft and there is no evidence to suggest
that Ernst did not take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of Ikon's default
reserves-this is not a material dispute with respect to scienter. See id. (finding no
evidence that Ernst failed to attempt to ensure accuracy of client's reserves).
150. Id. at 668 (describing Ernst's reasonable conduct by mentioning "the
magnitude of Ernst's audit for fiscal year 1997"). Specifically, Ernst conducted six
full scope audits, eight localized audits at Ikon business units that accounted for
most of Ikon's revenues, review procedures at Ikon's corporate headquarters, re-
views of previous years' audits and external testing of Ikon's account balances. See
id. (specifying Ernst's reasonable conduct); see also In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 131 F. Supp. 2d 680, 704 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("[T]he general scope and
nature of the audit work make it difficult to raise an inference of scienter, espe-
cially in light of the highly detailed documentary evidence of Ernst's procedures,
calculations and findings, which Ernst itself produced in the course of its audit.").
151. For a discussion of scienter requirements in the Third Circuit, see supra
notes 70-103 and accompanying text.
152. SeeThor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979) (determin-
ing GAAP "are far from being a canonical set of rules that will ensure identical
accounting treatment of identical transactions .... Rather, [they] tolerate a range
of 'reasonable' treatments, leaving the choice among alternatives to
management").
153. See Ikon, 277 F.3d at 675 n.22 (stating that "a reasonable accountant may
choose to apply any of a variety of acceptable procedures when preparing a finan-
cial statement") (citing Godchaux v. Conveying Techniquest, Inc., 846 F.2d 306,
315 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Ikon, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (recognizing that GAAP
"tolerates a range of reasonable treatments") (quoting In re Cirrus Logic Sec. Li-
tig., 946 F. Supp. 1446, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
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ant's figures differed from another's.' 54 Instead, the Third Circuit's stan-
dard requires an egregious breach that signals an intent to defraud.
1 55
By requiring a showing that an accounting firm's methods were un-
reasonable or grossly inconsistent with accepted accounting practices, the
Third Circuit lessens the chance that an accounting firm will be the scape-
goat when a company's financial status takes a sudden downturn. 156 This
stance suggests that accountants are not supposed to be the end all and be
all. Because their opinions only need be reasonable, the court is not sad-
dling professionals, such as accountants, with complete responsibility
when shareholders begin looking for a deep pocket. 157 The Third Cir-
cuit's position thus suggests that it may be more difficult in some instances
to implicate an accounting firm because this standard requires a plaintiff
to make an especially strong showing before scienter will be deemed pre-
sent.158 Nevertheless, the court expressed concern that it may be insulat-
ing auditors too much, especially crafty auditors who try to protect
themselves from liability stemming from an audit by stating up front the
potential risks that exist.
159
Particularly relevant to the practitioner, the court clarified and simul-
taneously broadened the techniques that can be applied to prove scien-
ter.' 60 The court reiterated that circumstantial evidence can be used to
establish scienter.' 6 1 The court did not attempt, however, to limit the
154. See kon, 277 F.3d at 677 ("A jury may not premise a finding of willful or
knowing conduct to defraud or recklessness merely by judging between competing
but nevertheless sound accounting methodologies."). The court noted:
"[h]ighlighting different accounting methodologies that Ernst might have em-
ployed . . .does not suggest that the approach actually chosen was an extreme
departure from ordinary care." Id.
155. For a discussion of the Third Circuit standard, see supra notes 85-103
and accompanying text.
156. See Ikon, 277 F.3d at 675 ("As there is no evidence to suggest Ernst's
method . . .was unreasonable or grossly inconsistent . . . , there is no basis to
conclude that Ernst fraudulently certified ...the reserve.").
157. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933,
942-43 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that where defendants intend consequences of their
action, advice of counsel that they will not incur liability is not defense to Section
10 (b) scienter requirement). The court's stance that reliance on advice of counsel
is not a complete defense parallels the court's decision not to hold accountants
liable for wrongdoings of their clients. See id. at 943 (" [W] here ... [defendants']
know the materiality of the concealed information and intend the consequences of
concealment, advice of counsel ... cannot be recognized as a defense.").
158. See Ikon, 277 F.3d at 674 n.21 (noting that "the threshold for scienter is
considerable").
159. See id. ("[W]e are wary to raise the bar even higher and insulate auditors
who craftily choose not to memorialize confirmed problems or to qualify their
observations with highly equivocal terms like 'risk,' 'potential,' and 'likelihood."').
160. See id. at 667 n.7 (expanding techniques to prove scienter) (citing Mc-
Lean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979)).
161. See id. (noting that, nonetheless, court rejects appellants' many attempts
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kind of circumstantial evidence used. 162 The court stated that circumstan-
tial evidence is not limited to the examples in McLean (i.e., scienter can be
proven by "accounting practices amounting at best to a pretended audit"),
but rather plaintiffs can use "whatever means" to establish scienter.1 63
In addition, the court expressed distaste about using "discrete errors"
discovered months after the completion of the actual audit work to
demonstrate scienter. 164 Even though the court referred to the appel-
lants' attempt to pick apart the audit as "misshapen jigsaw pieces that col-
lectively fail to reveal the picture embedded within the puzzle," the court
did not rule out using specific accounting violations collectively consid-
ered to prove scienter.' 65 Practitioners should note that the court clari-
fied that individual defects in the aggregate are one of the most plausible
ways to prove that an accounting firm did not believe in the accuracy of its
audit. 166
Another consideration is that the court felt that Andersen's reaching
of the same decision not to restate the 1997 financials was "highly proba-
tive of the competence of Ernst's 1997 audit opinion."'16 7 This is so even
though Andersen was not hired to review the 1997 opinion or financial
statements for compliance with GAAP or GAAS but to be the Ikon board's
accounting expert in regard to its investigation of the Special Proce-
dures. 168 Moreover, the court failed to consider that in reaching its opin-
162. See id. ("We did not intend in McLean . . . to restrict the scienter
threshold .... ).
163. See id. (holding that scienter can be proven in many ways). For a further
discussion of circumstantial evidence, see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text.
164. See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 131 F. Supp. 2d 680, 703
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that demonstrating Ernst's scienter based only on discrete
examples of poor auditing is more difficult because of vast scope of Ernst's audit).
For a further discussion of the court's treatment of hindsight, see supra note 93
and accompanying text.
165. Ikon, 277 F.3d at 677 (concluding that specific allegations here did not
rise to level of scienter).
166. See id. at 677 n.26 (explaining method to prove scienter). The court
added:
We do not suggest, however, that individual defects in an audit could not,
in the aggregate, create an inference of scienter, particularly at the sum-
mary judgment stage. To the contrary, in many cases the most plausible
means to prevail on a section 10(b) claim against an auditor-without
that ever-elusive "smoking gun" document or admission-will be to show
how specific and not insignificant accounting violations collectively raise
an inference of scienter.
Id.
167. Id. at 669 (stating that Andersen's endorsement of Ernst's audit "under-
mines any suggestion that Ernst could not reasonably have opined that IKON's
financial statements fairly presented its financial condition in accordance with
GAAP").
168. See id. at 669 n. Il (noting that before reviewing Ernst's work, Andersen
had to agree in writing not to report to Ikon's board if it determined that 1997
audit violated generally accepted auditing standards).
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ion, Andersen was merely relying on the work papers produced by
Ernst. 169 Because Andersen was not even performing an audit of the 1997
opinion, the fact that Andersen agreed with Ernst's conclusions should
not have been given so much weight by the court. 170 Nevertheless, the
court's deference to a rival accounting firm's findings suggests another
potential defense for accountants accepted by the Third Circuit.' 7'
A practitioner should also consider that in Ikon the court was deciding
whether there was a triable issue with respect to scienter sufficient to sur-
vive a motion for summary judgment. 172 The court recognized that a find-
ing of scienter is very fact intensive and usually requires an assessment of
witness credibility.' 73 Nevertheless, it is significant that despite all of the
appellants' allegations of fraud, the court did not think any of them was
sufficient to warrant a jury's decision as to whether Ernst acted with scien-
ter.' 74 This demonstrates the difficult burden any plaintiff has of proving
an accounting firm's scienter.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in lRon aligned the Third Circuit's standard for Section
10(b) scienter with the accountant's objectives in certifying a company's
financial statements. 1 75 The court stated that because auditors are only
required to express an opinion on the fairness of management's financial
representations, an accountant's mere incorrect opinion is insufficient to
demonstrate an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.' 76 Moreover,
the court clarified the precedent leading up to Ikon by establishing that a
high degree of recklessness is required before scienter can be found. Con-
sequently, practitioners will have a difficult time proving that discrete er-
169. See id. at 669 ("Though not performing an outright audit ... Andersen
allocated hundreds of hours of labor to its examination of the work papers pro-
duced by Ernst in 1997.").
170. See id. (comparing number of hours Ernst worked on Ikon's 1997 audit
(over 10,000) to "hundreds of hours of labor" that Andersen allocated).
171. See id. (concluding that no errors asserted by appellant indicate
scienter).
172. See id. at 666 (noting that plaintiff need only show evidence sufficient to
convince reasonable fact finder to find all elements of prima facie case).
173. See id. at 668 (stating that determination of scienter cannot often be un-
dertaken appropriately on summary judgment proceedings).
174. See id. at 670 (holding that jury could not infer departure from standards
of ordinary care based on evidence presented).
175. See id. at 673 (noting that "objective of the ordinary examination of fi-
nancial statements by the independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on
the fairness with which they present financial position, results of operations, and
changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles") (citing United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 786 n.27 (9th Cir.
1978)).
176. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's approach as to what con-
stitutes scienter, see supra notes 70-103 and accompanying text.
20031 1353
25
Boncarosky: Accounting Firm or Guarantor - The Third Circuit's Answer to Rule
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
1354 VIu.ANovA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48: p. 1329
rors discovered in hindsight rise to the level of scienter. 177 Overall, the
Third Circuit's stance indicates that it is providing protection for account-
ing firms from plaintiffs such as disappointed shareholders searching for a
deep pocket.
Julie A. Boncarosky
177. For a further discussion of the lMon court's understanding of the term
"recklessness," see supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 5 [2003], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss5/3
